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Research has shown that experiencing a single disaster inﬂuences people's risk judgments about the
hazard, but few studies have studied how multiple disasters in different locations affect risk judgments.
Following two earthquake sequences in two different regions (Christchurch, Cook Strait), this study
examined earthquake risk judgments, non-fatalism and preparation in two New Zealand cities that were
near to one of those sequences (Christchurch in Canterbury, Wellington near Cook Strait) and in one city
that was distant from both events (Palmerston North). Judgments of earthquake likelihood were higher
after the Cook Strait earthquakes than before in Christchurch and the rest of New Zealand, but not in
Wellington, where the baseline risk was high. However, participants in all cities saw the risk as more real,
plausible, and important after these earthquakes, particularly in Wellington. Preparations following the
earthquakes were also higher in Wellington and Christchurch (where non-fatalism was highest) than in
Palmerston North. Causal attributions for (not) preparing differed across the three cities, as did non-
fatalism. These ﬁndings suggest that the Christchurch and Cook Strait earthquakes had a combined effect
on citizens' perception of the risk, particularly in Wellington. Such events create a valuable window of
opportunity for agencies wishing to enhance preparedness.
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
In September 2010 and February 2011, earthquakes struck near
Christchurch city in Canterbury, New Zealand, resulting in 185
fatalities and $40 billion in damage, over 20% of GDP (New Zealand
Treasury 2013). Most New Zealand citizens had expected an
earthquake near Wellington, which sits near several major faults,
rather than Christchurch. Two years later in 2013, a series of
earthquakes occurred in the Cook Strait (and Seddon near the
Strait), near the city of Wellington. These earthquakes incurred no
deaths but seriously damaged a number of buildings and gaveLtd. This is an open access article u
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re).Wellington citizens a taste of major shaking that many had not
experienced before. What effect did these two series of events
following in quick succession have on New Zealanders' judgments
of earthquake risk and their preparation?
1.1. Risk judgments about natural disasters
Citizens' risk judgments are not sufﬁcient to get them to pre-
pare, but recognition of the risk is a prerequisite to preparation
[21]. Few people prepare if they think there is no likelihood of an
earthquake. People often discount low frequency events like
earthquakes and fail to prepare for them while prioritising risks
from more frequent events that may have minor consequences
[38]. In addition, people often hold unrealistic optimism and see
themselves as less at risk from hazards than others [35]. This bias
occurs with natural hazards such as hurricanes and tornados
[33,45], and earthquakes [4,12,26,40]. This optimistic bias is
highest for rare events such as earthquakes [8] and is resistant to
change [47].
Risk judgments and optimism are inﬂuenced by experiencing a
hazard, although such effects depend on other factors. Wherender the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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hazard and are less optimistic [18,21,48]. Experience of a hazard
makes the risk more available in citizens' thinking [46], and people
directly exposed to hazards see the risk as higher than people who
are distant from the events [50]. However, when people suffer no
ill effects from a hazard event, the opposite effect occurs where
they show a ‘normalisation bias’ and discount the risk of that
hazard [15,26,27].
Judgments of the risk from hazards also reﬂect baseline prob-
abilities and expectancies; if people expect a hazard before it oc-
curs, their judgment of the likelihood of that hazard may not in-
crease when they experience it [1,16,23]. McClure et al. [24]
showed that when an earthquake happens in an unexpected place
(as in Christchurch in 2011), the event has different effects on risk
judgments in different locations. In their recall of the earthquake
likelihood before the Christchurch earthquakes,1 participants
judged an earthquake more likely in Wellington, where an
earthquake was expected but did not occur, than in Christchurch,
where an earthquake was not expected but did occur. These
judgments show the effects of expectancies, as Wellington has a
history of damaging earthquakes (notably in 1848, 1855 and 1942)
and scientists have long predicted more earthquakes there [19]. In
contrast, after the Christchurch earthquakes, participants saw a
future earthquake as equally likely in Christchurch and Well-
ington, showing that the experience of a disaster in an unexpected
location (Christchurch) sharpens judgments of risk. Thus partici-
pants' base rate expectancy of an earthquake was previously
higher for Wellington [5,6], but increased in Christchurch after the
Christchurch earthquakes.
1.2. The effect of multiple events on risk judgments and preparation
Much research on risk judgments following natural disasters
has examined the effects of experiencing a single disaster on
judgments of the risk from that hazard [4,11,12,20,36,45]. Some
studies have shown the effects of multiple tornadoes, but these
were all in the same region (see [50]). Research in other domains
suggests that multiple events augment risk judgments more than
a single event [37]. However, few studies have studied the effects
of multiple hazards in different locations on citizens' judgments of
the risk from those hazards.
One exception that has studied the effect of multiple hazard
events is Russell et al. [32], who examined preparedness before
and after the 1987 Whittier Narrows earthquake near Los Angeles
and the 1989 Loma Prieta earthquake near San Francisco. Russell
et al. [32] found that preparation increased over this period. In
addition, mitigation actions increased after the earthquakes,
especially in San Francisco, which experienced the damaging Loma
Prieta earthquake. The study did not examine changes in citizens'
perception of the likelihood of earthquakes, although it did show
that having frequent thoughts about earthquakes predicted more
preparation. A second study focusing on multiple events in dif-
ferent locations examined citizens' risk judgments about torna-
does, which are more common than damaging earthquakes [48].
The study compared risk judgments and optimism in three towns
recently struck by tornadoes with two control towns in states with
similar tornado frequencies that were not struck by these torna-
does. Optimistic risk judgments were lower in impact towns than
in control towns, yet they did not completely subside.
A similar sequence of events to those studied by Russell et al.
[32] recently occurred in New Zealand. The 2010-20111 Of the two earthquakes in the province of Canterbury in 2010 and 2011, only
the 2011 earthquake was directly in Christchurch, but we refer in this paper to ‘the
Christchurch earthquakes’ to prevent confusion from using multiple place names.Christchurch earthquakes caused 185 deaths and $40 billion in
damage. Two years later, a second series of earthquakes occurred
in July and August 2013 in Cook Strait and Seddon, both close to
Wellington (50 km and 80 km respectively). Wellington is the
third largest city in New Zealand (population 300,000) and a
major earthquake has long been expected there, due to its proxi-
mity to multiple faults.
Although no deaths resulted from the 2013 Cook Strait earth-
quakes, these events were widely felt as strong shaking in Well-
ington and a number of buildings were damaged [14]. Maximum
peak ground acceleration (PGA) in Wellington City was 0.2 g for
the July earthquake (Cook Strait) and 0.26 g for the August one
(Seddon), making these earthquakes the most severe in Well-
ington since 1977 [10,14]. There were also a signiﬁcant number of
EQC (Earthquake Commission) insurance claims; these were con-
centrated in Wellington more than cities further from the earth-
quakes. For example, for the 21 July 2013 earthquake, there were
1863 EQC claims in Wellington, 80 in Palmerston North and 37 in
Christchurch (Bede Dwyer, EQC). There were similar proportions of
claims for the August event.
1.3. The present study
Most Wellington citizens were very aware of the earlier
Christchurch earthquakes and had friends or relatives in that re-
gion [24], but they did not directly experience these events. In
contrast, they did feel strong shaking from the Cook Strait events.
The question we examined here is what effect these two sets of
events (Christchurch and Cook Strait earthquakes) had on citizens'
judgments of the likelihood of earthquakes and preparation in
three cities: Wellington, whose citizens did not directly experience
the Christchurch earthquakes but who did feel strong shaking
from the Cook Strait earthquakes; Christchurch, where the major
earthquakes occurred in 2010–2011 but was further from the Cook
Strait earthquakes (approx. 300 km); and Palmerston North, which
did not directly feel either series of earthquakes and where citi-
zens had a lower expectancy of a future earthquake [31]. Palmer-
ston North thus served as a comparison group for the two more
directly affected locations (Wellington and Christchurch), similar
to Weinstein et al.'s [48] study.
Thus a key issue we examined here is: How did people respond
after the two major earthquake sequences in Christchurch and
Cook Strait, which is closer to Wellington? We expected that these
two events would affect people in Wellington more than
Christchurch, because Christchurch citizens had directly experi-
enced major earthquakes just two years earlier, and could be ex-
pected to judge earthquakes equally likely before and after the
Cook Strait earthquakes and to prepare more before the Cook
Strait earthquakes. In contrast, Wellington citizens were directly
exposed to the strong shaking from the Cook Strait earthquakes
only two years after they had seen the major effects of the
earthquakes in Christchurch. So Wellington citizens had the
combined experience of the vicarious knowledge of the Christch-
urch earthquakes and the direct experience of the Cook Strait
earthquakes. We anticipated that these two events would act as a
sharp wake up call to Wellington citizens who did not recognise
the risk or prepare after the Christchurch events.
For risk measures, we assessed judgments of earthquake like-
lihood for different regions and added two new measures asses-
sing judgments that the risk is more real, plausible and important
since the Cook Strait earthquakes. We thought that these new
measures would be less vulnerable than the likelihood measures
to hindsight bias, where recall judgments are coloured by sub-
sequent events [9]. New Zealand citizens expected an earthquake
in Wellington prior to these two earthquake sequences [1,24], so
we expected any ‘wake-up’ effect after the Cook Strait events to
Table 1
Types of preparation and attributions before and after the Cook Strait earthquakes
for (not) preparing (participants tick those that apply). Each category also had an
‘other’ option.
Types of preparation
1. Got basic needs e.g. canned food, water, emergency kit, torch, batteries, battery
radio
2. Contents damage mitigation e.g. attach shelves to wall, shift heavy objects to
lower levels
3. Structural damage mitigation; e.g. quake-safe the house, or check it's safe, re-
move brick chimney
4. Logistics/planning e.g., planned where to meet
Attributions for preparing
1. My personality, e.g., I'm a sensible person
2. Just in case of an emergency
3. I thought an earthquake might happen
4. The Canterbury earthquake and damage was a wake-up call for me
5. Advice from media, education
Attributions for not preparing
1. My personality e.g., I'm complacent, lazy, or unorganised and did not get around
to it
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plausible and important, rather than increased ratings of earth-
quake likelihood.
We made the following predictions: ﬁrst, with regard to
earthquake likelihood judgments, we predicted that participants
in all three locations (Wellington, Christchurch, Palmerston North)
would judge earthquakes more likely after these earthquakes than
they recalled before the earthquakes. Second, with regard to dif-
ferences across participant cities, we predicted that Wellington
participants would see the risk of earthquakes as more real,
plausible and important after the Cook Strait earthquakes, would
prepare more than other participants, and would attribute their
preparations more to the Christchurch earthquakes being a wake-
up call than other participants. Third, we predicted that
Christchurch participants would be less fatalistic about the value
of preparation, due to their exposure to the beneﬁcial effects of
preparation in the Christchurch earthquakes in 2010–2011, and
that Wellington and Palmerston North participants would have
similar levels of non-fatalism.2. I did not think about it
3. I thought an earthquake would not happen - that it was not a serious risk
4. I thought there would not be another big earthquake so soon after the Canter-
bury [Christchurch] earthquakes
5. I did not take advice from the media seriously2. Method
2.1. Participants
Participants were in three locations in New Zealand: Well-
ington (N¼106), Christchurch (N¼156), and Palmerston North
(N¼120). The Cook Strait earthquakes were close to Wellington,
where a major earthquake has been expected, and were 240
straight kilometres from Christchurch, which experienced major
earthquakes in 2010 and 2011, and 195 km from Palmerston North,
which has experienced no major earthquakes in recent times.
Data in the three cities were collected in November 2013, four
months following the Cook Strait earthquakes, after receiving
ethics approval for the Human Ethics Committee of Victoria Uni-
versity of Wellington. Participants were recruited from popular
market squares and parks in the three cities. The Wellington
sample of 106 participants comprised 32 men and 47 women
(27¼unstated) with a mean of 0.82 children per household. The
Christchurch sample comprised 156 participants (gender: mal-
e¼44, female¼67, unstated¼45) with a mean of 0.92 children.
The Palmerston North sample of 120 participants (gender: mal-
e¼36, female¼45, unstated¼39) had a mean of 1.44 children per
household.
2.2. Materials/procedure
To address the predictions, questions compared judgments of
earthquake likelihood for the same three locations: the two most
directly affected cities (Wellington and Christchurch) and the rest
of New Zealand. This design differs from that in McClure et al. [24],
where participants in Christchurch, Wellington, and Palmerston
North rated earthquake likelihoods in their own city, in Christch-
urch, and in the rest of NZ. Thus in the present study, citizens in
Palmerston North did not rate earthquake likelihood in their own
city. Our rationale was to get judgments of earthquake likelihood
about the same locations from all participants and use citizens in
Palmerston North as a comparison group who experienced neither
series of earthquakes.
Questions ﬁrst assessed the perceived earthquake likelihood of
a big earthquake occurring before (recall data) and after the Cook
Strait earthquakes in three locations: Wellington, Christchurch,
and another part of New Zealand. Participants responded on a
5-point Likert scale with anchor points labelled 1¼ 'Not at all
likely' and 5¼ 'Very likely'. We created two new questions asking
whether the risk of an earthquake was more real or plausible sincethe Cook Strait earthquakes, and whether the combined occur-
rence of the Christchurch and the Cook Strait earthquakes in-
creased participants' feeling that earthquakes were an important
risk for them and their region. These questions enabled partici-
pants from Palmerston North to rate the salience of earthquake
risk, despite not rating the likelihood of an earthquake in their
own city.
We also examined participants' preparation, attributions for
their (lack of) preparation and non-fatalism. Questions about
preparation [24] asked ﬁrstly whether participants had made any
earthquake preparations before and after the Cook Strait earth-
quakes, and secondly which of ﬁve types of preparation they had
made (see Table 1). Questions also asked participants to select the
main reason for preparing or not preparing from a list of attribu-
tions (Table 1), adapted from McClure et al. [24].
One question assessed non-fatalistic beliefs by asking if pre-
paration for earthquakes is likely to reduce harm and loss from a
very big earthquake. Questions also asked whether participants
incurred any damage during the Cook Strait earthquakes, if they
knew anyone close to themwho lives in Seddon (near Cook Strait),
and if they knew anyone who incurred damage during either the
Cook Strait or the Christchurch earthquakes. Demographics in-
cluded gender, age, number of dependent children per household
and suburb. Participants were told the questionnaire was about
earthquakes but not the speciﬁc hypotheses.3. Results
A correlation matrix is shown in Table 2. This shows that par-
ticipants' feeling that earthquakes are an important risk in their
region correlated with their judgment of the likelihood of earth-
quakes since the Cook Strait earthquakes. Interestingly, judgments
that the risk was more real and plausible correlated negatively
with judgments of the likelihood of earthquakes in Wellington
(recall) and the rest of NZ (recall and after).
3.1. Expectancies of a large earthquake before and after the cook
strait earthquakes
Fig. 1 shows the mean ratings of the likelihood of an
Table 2
Correlation matrix.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Wellington recall 1
2. Wellington after .51** 1
3. Christchurch recall .18** .13* 1
4. Christchurch after .12* .30** .26** 1
5. NZ recall .44** .28** .32** .10* 1
6. NZ after .31** .38** .11* .22** .53** 1
7. Risk more real  .13* .07  .09 .09  .18**  .13* 1
8. Combined EQs .21** .33** .10 .30** .11* .21** .11* 1
9. Preparation before EQ .16** .11* .07 .08 .08 .05  .08 .24** 1
10. Preparations since EQ  .02 .02  .05 .13*  .08  .03 .18** .20** .17** 1
11. Non-fatalism .21** .20**  .03 .04 .11* .12* .04 .16** .14**  .09 1
12. Did you incur damage .07 .04  .05 .05  .03  .02 .08 .09 .18** .09 .07 1
* po .05 (two tailed).
** po .01 (two tailed).
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earthquakes. To test our predictions about these judgments, we
performed a 3 (Participant city: Christchurch, Wellington, Pal-
merston North)3 (Earthquake location: Christchurch, Well-
ington, other part of NZ)2 (Time: Before, After) mixed design
ANOVA on likelihood ratings. The multivariate tests showed that
ﬁrst, as predicted, participants judged an earthquake more likely
after the Cook Strait earthquakes (M¼3.89, SE¼0.04) than they
recalled before the earthquakes (M¼3.31, SE¼0.04), F(1, 375)¼
205.69, po .001. η2¼ .35. Second, participants thought a large
earthquake was more likely in Wellington (M¼3.97, SE¼0.04) and
in another part of New Zealand (hereafter called ‘elsewhere’)
(M¼3.93, SE¼0.05) than Christchurch (M¼2.99, SE¼0.04), F(2,
378)¼230.73, po .001. η2¼ .55. Third, Palmerston North partici-
pants judged an earthquake more likely than those in Christchurch
and Wellington, F(2, 375)¼7.51, po .001. η2¼ .04.
These main effects are qualiﬁed by two interactions. There was
a 2-way interaction between earthquake location and time, F(2,
756)¼28.12, po .001, η2¼ .07. As shown in Fig. 1, prior to the Cook
Strait earthquakes, participants recalled judging the likelihood of
earthquakes in Wellington or elsewhere higher than in Christch-
urch. After the earthquakes, this likelihood increased more in
Christchurch (M¼0.91) than in Wellington (M¼0.48) or elsewhere
(M¼0.41), F(2, 754)¼30.32, po .001, η2¼ .07, although it was still
lower in Christchurch than the other two locations.
There was a 3-way interaction between participant city,
earthquake location, and time, F(4, 756)¼6.63, po .001, η2¼ .03.
As shown in Fig. 1, participants in the three cities judged an
earthquake in Wellington equally likely prior to the earthquakes, F
(2, 377)¼0.46, ns, and after the earthquakes, F(2, 378)¼0.11, ns. In
contrast, Palmerston North participants judged an earthquake
more likely in Christchurch, F(2, 378)¼14.92, po .001, and else-
where in NZ, F(2, 377)¼8.72, po .001, after the earthquakes thanother participants.3.2. Was the earthquake risk more real and important after the Cook
Strait earthquakes?
On the question asking if participants thought the risk of a
future big earthquake was more real and plausible since the Cook
Strait earthquakes, 89% of participants said yes, with no difference
for participant city, χ2 (2)¼2.14, ns. There were however differ-
ences across cities on whether the combined occurrence of the
Christchurch and Cook Strait earthquakes increased participants'
feeling that earthquakes are an important risk in their region, F(2,
376)¼6.00, po .01, η2¼ .03. Post hoc Bonferroni tests (po .05)
showed that the earthquake risk was judged more important by
participants in Wellington (M¼4.25, SD¼0.94) than in Christch-
urch (M¼3.94, SD¼1.00) and Palmerston North (M¼3.79,
SD¼1.06).3.3. Having acquaintances near the earthquake, incurring damage
and non-fatalism
A mixed design ANOVA showed no difference in participants
from Wellington and Christchurch who did (20%) or did not (80%)
have close acquaintances near Cook Strait on the likelihood of an
earthquake in their own city, F(1, 252)¼0.44, ns. An ANOVA on
whether people had incurred damage showed that participants
from Christchurch (M¼2.37, SD¼1.33) reported more damage in
the earthquakes than those from Wellington (M¼1.36, SD¼0.82)
or Palmerston North (M¼1.17, SD¼0.61), F(2, 370)¼55.38,
po .001, η2¼ .23. It is likely that this result reﬂects the huge da-
mage in the Christchurch earthquakes. Because of the low num-
bers at the extremes of the scale, data were grouped into two cells:
no or low damage (ratings 1 or 2, N¼291) and moderate to high
damage (ratings 3–5, N¼80). A mixed design ANOVA showed that
having suffered damage had no relation to judgments of earth-
quake likelihood, F(8, 740)¼0.52, ns.
An ANOVA on the non-fatalism question showed that partici-
pant city related to judgments of non-fatalism (i.e., the belief that
strengthening earthquake-prone buildings is likely to reduce the
risk of harm and loss), F(2, 366)¼2.92, po .05. Participants in
Christchurch (M¼4.12, SD¼1.15) were less fatalistic than partici-
pants in Palmerston North (Palmerston North, M¼3.81, SD¼1.06),
F(1, 269)¼5.83, po .001. Wellington non-fatalism scores fell in
between (M¼4.12, SD¼1.15). Low fatalism correlated with pre-
paration before the earthquakes.
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The proportion of participants who reported preparing for an
earthquake before and after the Cook Strait earthquakes differed
by city. More participants recalled preparing before the earth-
quakes in Christchurch (65%) and Wellington (60%) than in Pal-
merston North (45%), χ2 (2)¼11.65, po .01, Cramer's V¼ .18. In
contrast, after the earthquakes, more people prepared in Well-
ington (74%) than in Christchurch (58%) and Palmerston North
(46%), χ2 (2)¼19.63, po .001, Cramer's V¼ .23.
Preparation before the earthquakes correlates with the like-
lihood of an earthquake in Wellington, r(367)¼ .16, po .01, but not
in Christchurch or elsewhere (Table 2). In contrast, after the
earthquakes, preparation relates to seeing the risk as more real
and plausible, r(378)¼ .18, po .001, and their increased feeling that
earthquakes are an important risk in their region r(378)¼ .20,
po .001.
Fig. 2 shows the types of preparations people reported. Chi
square analyses show that across all cities, more participants
prepared before than after the earthquakes, po .05. The cities
differed three actions. On actions to mitigate damage to contents,
before the earthquakes more participants acted in Christchurch
than the other two cities, χ2 (2)¼23.67, po .001, whereas after the
earthquakes more participants acted in Christchurch and Well-
ington than Palmerston North: χ2 (2)¼8.57, po .05. On actions to
mitigate structural damage, more participants acted in Christch-
urch than the other cities, both before, χ2 (2)¼6.63, po .05, and
after the earthquakes, χ2 (2)¼16.62, po .001. Logistics did not
differ across locations before the earthquakes, χ2 (2)¼5.27, p4 .05,
but after the earthquakes, more acted in Wellington than in
Christchurch and Palmerston North, χ2 (2)¼11.34, po .05.
3.5. Attributions for (not) preparing
Fig. 3 shows the reasons participants cited for preparing. All
reasons had higher frequencies before the earthquakes than after0
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Fig. 4 shows the reasons for not preparing, which were higher
before the earthquakes than after, po .05, except for ‘Ignore media
advice’. Before the earthquakes, Christchurch participants were
higher on ‘Too soon after’, χ2 (2)¼8.32, p4 .05, Cramer's V¼ .23,
whereas after the earthquakes, Wellington participants were
higher on ‘Ignore media advice’, χ2 (2)¼6.12, p4 .05, Cramer's
V¼ .20 and lower on ‘I did not think about it’, χ2 (2)¼8.38, p4 .05,
Cramer's V¼ .23. In the ‘other’ option, several said they had ade-
quate preparations in place.4. Discussion
4.1. Judgments of earthquake likelihood before and after the Cook
Strait earthquakes
As predicted, participants judged an earthquake more likely for
all three locations after the Cook Strait earthquakes than they re-
called before. This ﬁnding supports previous ﬁndings that people
judge hazards more likely after experiencing those hazards [11,22],
especially in comparison to control groups in other locations
[32,48]. This likelihood judgment correlates with participants'
judgments that the combined occurrence of the Christchurch and
Cook Strait earthquakes increased their feeling that earthquakes
are an important risk, which suggests that the risk is to some
extent personalised. However, likelihood judgments (especially
before the earthquakes) correlate negatively with judgments that
the risk is more real and plausible. This interesting ﬁnding is likely
to reﬂect a real difference rather than a bias, as people who see
earthquakes as unlikely before an earthquake occurs are more
likely to see the risk as real and plausible when earthquakes do
occur.
More surprising is participants' view of where earthquakes are
likely, particularly their judgment that earthquakes were less
likely in Christchurch than Wellington before the Cook Strait
earthquakes. These earthquakes occurred only two years after the
damaging Christchurch earthquakes, and we expected the risk
estimates for Christchurch to be higher, consistent with ﬁndings
soon after the Christchurch earthquakes, two years prior to this
study [24]. This result shows how the effects of a damaging
earthquake on judgments of earthquake likelihood can dissipate
over time (cf. [4]).
There are several possible interpretations of this result. First,
although the measure of earthquake likelihood asked for
J. McClure et al. / International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 16 (2016) 192–199 197judgments ‘before the July/August Cook Strait/Seddon earthquakes’,
some participants may have reported the likelihood before the
Christchurch earthquakes. It is pertinent that the likelihood
judgments after the earthquakes increased more in Christchurch
than the other two locations. An alternative interpretation of this
result is that when the aftershocks in Christchurch reduced in
2012–2013, participants made a ‘gamblers fallacy’ judgment that
Christchurch had received 'its share' of earthquakes [48]. This re-
sult suggests that New Zealand citizens are reverting to their
earlier view that an earthquake is less likely in Christchurch than
in Wellington, where earthquakes are expected [1]. It is as if they
saw the Christchurch earthquakes as a short term anomaly. An-
other possibility is that when rating the likelihood of an earth-
quake in Christchurch, participants judged the likelihood of a fu-
ture aftershock speciﬁc to the 2010–2011 Christchurch earthquake
sequence. As there have been few major aftershocks in this se-
quence since December 2011, participants may have judged that
the sequence was ﬁnished or ‘de-pressurised’, lowering their
perceived base rate for this event and the region [5].
4.2. The relation of participant location to likelihood judgments
A second interesting ﬁnding is the effect for participant city,
where in their recall of before the Cook Strait earthquakes, parti-
cipants from Palmerston North judged an earthquake more likely
in Christchurch and in the rest of New Zealand than the partici-
pants in the other two cities. Why this difference? One possibility
is that Wellington and Christchurch participants live in cities for
which earthquake likelihood judgments were made in this study.
Also Christchurch and Wellington citizens had experienced recent
earthquakes and now had direct and vicarious experience of re-
cent earthquakes, whereas those in Palmerston North had not. The
experience of a natural disaster is more dramatic and emotional
than people expect [36]. This experience may have led participants
in Christchurch and Wellington to feel that previously they did not
expect anything like what they actually experienced; so they rated
the pre-event likelihood lower than did persons in Palmerston
North. This ‘hindsight bias’ interpretation [9] is supported by
participants' judgment that the combined occurrence of the two
earthquake sequences increased their feeling that earthquakes
were an important risk for them and their region; this was higher
in Wellington and Christchurch than Palmerston North. Palmer-
ston North could be seen as the outlier, but their response may be
the norm for cities not affected by an earthquake.
In contrast with the likelihood judgments for Christchurch and
the rest of NZ, participants from all three cities judged the like-
lihood of an earthquake in Wellington similarly. Citizens across
New Zealand had long expected an earthquake in Wellington,
based on GNS (Science) forecasts, the news media [1] and its
history of earthquakes.
4.3. Preparation, non-fatalism and attributions
Preparation after the Cook Strait earthquakes showed a positive
relationship to seeing the risk as more real and plausible and the
feeling that earthquakes are an important risk in their region. This
relationship suggests that these novel measures of perceived risk
are more valuable in predicting preparation than measures of
whether an earthquake is likely, which showed a weak relation-
ship with preparation. Other research has shown that measures of
likelihood judgments that use verbal descriptions of probabilities
lack reliability and validity. There is wide variability in the inter-
pretation of words used to describe probabilities, such as ‘likely’ or
‘extremely high chance’ [3,17]. Such verbal expressions lack a
common deﬁnition and are interpreted as a wide range of
probabilities.In addition to expected patterns of preparation, such as parti-
cipants reporting more ‘basic needs’ actions than structural miti-
gation [41], the data have several interesting features. The ﬁnding
that participants reported preparing more before the Cook Strait
earthquakes than after is likely to be because the study was run
only ﬁve months after these earthquakes and allowed less time for
preparation. This especially applies to damage mitigation actions,
which may take a long time. In addition, some participants had
made preparations after the Christchurch earthquakes, particularly
in Christchurch [24], so these actions did not need repeating after
the Cook Strait earthquakes. You can only remove a brick chimney
once.
Notwithstanding this overall pattern of lower preparation after
the earthquakes, preparation differed across the three cities. Most
notably, whereas actions to mitigate damage were less frequent
after the Cook Strait earthquakes in Christchurch and Palmerston
North, there was no such decrease in Wellington. This difference
suggests that the two earthquake sequences served as a wakeup
call in nearby Wellington more than the other two cities, parti-
cularly Palmerston North, which experienced neither earthquake
sequence [46].
This interpretation is supported by the attribution data, where
participants who did prepare said they did so in case of an
emergency, because they thought it might happen and because the
Christchurch earthquakes were a wake-up call. These attributions
were cited more in Wellington and Christchurch than Palmerston
North, consistent with the earthquake likelihood judgments and
preparation. On attributions for not preparing after the Cook Strait
earthquakes, not a single person in Wellington said they didn't
think about it, suggesting availability of the hazard was high [48].
The lower preparation in Palmerston North is consistent with
ﬁndings that people who are distant from an event discount the
risk [50].
This interpretation of the risk perceptions and higher pre-
paration in Wellington is reinforced by reports of an acceleration
in the upgrading and demolition of earthquake-prone public
buildings in Wellington since the Cook Strait earthquakes, with
ﬁve buildings a month coming off the list of 700 such buildings
[34]. If this upgrading rate is maintained, all 700 would be dealt
with in just 12 years. In addition, since these earthquakes, Well-
ington has seen a trend of tenants shifting from earthquake-prone
buildings to more resilient buildings [44]. These patterns are
consistent with the ﬁnding that after these two earthquake se-
quences, Wellington citizens see the earthquake risk as more real
and important.
Non-Fatalism about the value of action to mitigate damage to
buildings was higher in Christchurch than in Palmerston North
(Wellington fell in between). This higher efﬁcacy in Christchurch
may reﬂect the direct experience of the 2010–2011 earthquakes
with the clear evidence of better outcomes for buildings that met
building standards. It is noteworthy in this regard that the only
preparation where Christchurch was higher than the other two
cities was on actions to mitigate damage.
This research focuses on citizens' judgment of earthquake risk
and preparation across different locations. We note that judg-
ments that a hazard is likely are not sufﬁcient for people to pre-
pare (e.g., [7,22,29,39]). People need to also understand how
preparations inﬂuence outcomes [2] and believe that preparation
is effective and worth the cost [22,30,42]. However, recognition of
the risk is a prerequisite for voluntary action, so risk commu-
nications should frame risks in effective ways [13,25,43].
4.4. Limitations
We have suggested that citizens' perception of earthquake
likelihood and risk (especially in Wellington) is an outcome of the
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no way to absolutely prove this interpretation and it is possible
that the risk perceptions and preparation in Wellington simply
reﬂect the recent Cook Strait earthquakes or other factors. How-
ever, Wellington participants did indicate that the combined ef-
fects of the two earthquake sequences led them to see the risk as
important. In addition, based on prior levels of risk perception and
preparation [1,24], it is unlikely that the level of post-Cook Strait
preparation in Wellington seen in this study and elsewhere [34]
would have occurred without the combined effect of the two
earthquake sequences. It is possible that some Christchurch citi-
zens may have declined to participate due to distress about the
Canterbury earthquakes.
4.5. Conclusions
These ﬁndings clarify how the experience of two earthquake
sequences in different locations relates to people's perception of
earthquake likelihood, their preparation and their attributions for
(not) preparing. These broad effects relate to citizens' location and
proximity to the events. Silver and Wortman [37] showed that the
experience of two negative events can increase helplessness and
impede recovery after these events [23]. In contrast, as with
Russell et al. [32] and Weinstein et al. [48], our results suggest that
two hazard events in different locations can have positive effects
in getting home the message that people in vulnerable regions
need to prepare. The pattern of risk judgments, preparation and
attributions all support this conclusion.
If the Cook Strait earthquakes had occurred in isolation and not
been preceded by the damaging Christchurch earthquake se-
quence, we speculate that citizens in Wellington would have
quickly forgotten about the Cook Strait events in 3–6 months,
maybe earlier. But the Cook Strait earthquakes rode on the tail of
the Christchurch earthquakes, which led to major destruction in
one of New Zealand's largest cities. The data suggest that the two
earthquake sequences are having a lasting impact, particularly in
Wellington, where people see the risk is more real and extensive
retroﬁtting of buildings is ongoing. These ﬁndings should also
apply to more frequent disasters such as ﬂoods and tornadoes,
where the occurrence of two events in different locations is rela-
tively common [48].
Agencies cannot simulate earthquakes to get citizens to take
the risk seriously. But they can exploit the window of opportunity
created by two earthquake series occurring in close temporal
proximity [43,49], even if these events are in distant locations.
Also, where no local earthquakes occur, agencies can enhance risk
judgments by prompting vicarious experience of hazard events
[21] and identiﬁcation with disasters in other countries [38]. An
example is when the Fukushima cascading disaster in Japan af-
fected risk judgments about nuclear power plants as far away as
Germany [28]. A key issue is understanding what factors lead
people to see a distant event as relevant to their own risk from the
same hazard, as occurred with Fukushima and the Christchurch
earthquakes.References
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